Message-ID: <v01550101b1c0cf809327@[193.10.14.51]> Date: Thu, 2 Jul 1998 09:13:11 +0200 From: Natalie Pauwels <mailto:pauwels@SIPRI.SE> Subject: Re: T.T. and security To: mailto:DEVEL-L@AMERICAN.EDU
Dear Sarah and list members,Thank you for your interesting comments on my short submission on technology transfer and security. You have brought up some points which are certainly worth exploring, since Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention has been one of the sticking points of the negotiations for a Compliance Protocol which would establish a monitoring and verification regime.
For the benefit of those who are unfamiliar with the treaty (most are, not suprisingly), the text of Article X is as follows:
1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the futher development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. 2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention."
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with BW (as compared to CW, for example), is that all potential BW agents can and are used for peaceful, prophylactic purposes such as medical research and the like. Thus, the problem of dual use is pervasive and complicates the issues even further than they did in the Chemical Weapons Convention negotiations (since many chemicals have little purpose other than weaponization). We can imagine the problems of slapping outright trade restrictions on certain biological agents, as happens with schedule 1 chemicals under the CWC, since the outbreak of infectious diseases is naturally occuring and widespread, particularly in developing countries. Of course, this is not the only argument used by developing countries in the negotiations. Another important issue is one which we see brought up in many international fora: the increasing technology gap between north and south. In industries such as biotechnology, genetic engineering and other relevant to the BTWC, this gap is perhaps the most persistent. There is a worry that the north will use the BTWC to restrict trade in these commercially sensitive and potentially very lucrative domains, thus monopolizing technologies and maintaining competitive advantage in these industries. And the argument is not without foundation. The problem with your suggestion that the north could consider the transfer of completed technologies is that with biological agents, there is really no such thing. Research on anthrax requires spores of anthrax itself. However anthrax can also be used as a biological weapons agent. Also, we are not talking about large quantities, but rather minute particles.
However, if a viable verification mechanism were to be brought into the regime, there is no reason why such transfers could not occur, since ALL States Party to the Convention would be subject to inspections by international teams. One would think that this could only solidify support for the BTWC and even encourage the transfer of technology and know-how. In the area of infectious disease, for example, there is talk of engaging the participation of the World Health Organization in epidemiological monitoring of outbreaks. Anything suspicious could be investigated for possible BW use. At the same time, the country in which the outbreak occured would have the benefit of international assistance.
>1. If a country is genuinely engaged in solely medical/peaceful
>applications, it suggests incoherence, political posturing, or perhaps
>even bad faith to resist the largely symbolic insult to sovereignty from
>monitoring and verification by a neutral team (eg Swedish-led).
Once a state has ratified the BTWC, it voluntarily relinquishes the 'right' to resist inspection. It is true that states not party to the Convention suffer the stigma associated with being 'on the outside'. However, closer inspection reveals that many of these have not signed or ratified for reasons unattributable to their being engaged in activities prohibitied by the Convention. I should mention that verification activities (inspections) are not "largely symbolic", although it is normal to some to such a conclusion. They are quite intrusive and have serious implications for industry, since they require access to documentation and information often considered to be classified intellectual property vital to commercial secrecy. As such, pharmaceutical associations in the United States and Europe in particular have been very vocal about their objections to a BTWC verification regime. PhRMA's position has been that it supports the goals and objectives of the Convention, however it fears*: 1. The loss of legitimate confidential business information; 2. the loss of good name by being linked to the manufacture of BW; and 3. the adoption of onerous implementing regulations. (* from PhRMA Position on a Compliance Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention)
The two positions, those of the manufacturers in the north and the governments of the south, are hardly dichotomous. If anything, they are at extremes. This makes for a difficult situation. I am looking into the south's position in the WTO negotiations on TRIPs (intellectual property) to see if there are close parallels with their position here. Perhaps there is something to learn. If anyone can point me to interesting sources, I would be grateful. Of course, any discussion on this topic is also most welcome.
Best wishes to all,
___________________________________________________________ I wrote: ___________________________________________________________ Hello,
I recently joined this list, so please forgive me if what I am going to write about seems completely off-the-mark.
My professional interest in the list is as fairly narrow in scope, although I am generally interested in following the discussion regardless of the topic.
I work at a peace research institute on a chemical and biological warfare project, and one key aspect of this is the problem of 'dual-use' goods. This was apparent in the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and is re-surfacing in the current negotiations for a Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Many developing countries Party to the negotiations raise the very important point that problems of imposing severe trade restrictions on certain goods or agents which could be used for hostile purposes (i.e. production of biological weapons) can also restrict their development. This is because most technologies used in the production of weapons of this type are also applicable to peaceful endeavours: medical and prophylactic in particular.
The negotiations are stalling over this point, as it remains a contentious issue. Yet without a Protocol which sets out an acceptable monitoring and verification procedure, the BTWC is unenforcable and will continue to be a weak link in the international disarmament regime.
Technology transfer is certainly a key element in international development. However, precautions must be taken in order to avoid the spread of technologies which can be converted towards the manufacture of weapons and thereby undermining not only social and economic progress, but also international security.
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********************************* Natalie Pauwels Research Assistant CBW Project SIPRI Froesunda S 169 70 Solna Sweden Phone: +46 8 655 97 32 Fax: +46 8 655 97 33 http://www.sipri.se/cbw/ *********************************