Received: from mp.cs.niu.edu (mp.cs.niu.edu [131.156.1.2]) by library.wustl.edu (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id SAA21593; Wed, 4 Jun 1997 18:25:25 -0500 (CDT) Received: by mp.cs.niu.edu id AA07867 (5.67b/IDA-1.5 for nepal-dist); Wed, 4 Jun 1997 15:46:31 -0500 Received: by mp.cs.niu.edu id AA07863 (5.67b/IDA-1.5 for nepal-list); Wed, 4 Jun 1997 15:46:29 -0500 Date: Wed, 4 Jun 1997 15:46:29 -0500 Message-Id: <199706042046.AA07863@mp.cs.niu.edu> Reply-To: The Nepal Digest <NEPAL@cs.niu.edu> From: The Editor <nepal-request@cs.niu.edu> Sender: "Rajpal J. Singh" <A10RJS1@cs.niu.edu> Subject: The Nepal Digest - June 5, 1997 (26 Jestha 2054 BkSm) To: <NEPAL@cs.niu.edu> Content-Type: text Status: O X-Status: X-Keywords: X-UID: 234
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% N N EEEEEE PPPPPP AA L %
% NN N E P P A A L %
% N N N EEEE P P A A L %
% N N N E PPPPPP AAAAAA L %
% N NN E P A A L %
% N N EEEEEE P A A LLLLLL %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The Nepal Digest Thursday June 5, 97: Jestha 26 2054BS: Year6 Volume63 Issue 5
Today's Topics:
Matrimony
Jigme insults Nepal
Murder No Crime
Nepali Constitution Analysis
Nepali News
News about Buddha Jayanti Celebration in Thailand.
Visit Nepal
Afghan Islamists Out to Destroy Epic Buddha Stat
In Memoriam Gopal Yonzon
New website on Nepal's hydropower
Looking at Nepal with Western Eyes - May be right!
******************************************************************************
* TND (The Nepal Digest) Editorial Board *
* -------------------------------------- *
* *
* The Nepal Digest: General Information info-tnd@nepal.org *
* Chief Editor: RJP Singh (Open Position) a10rjs1@mp.cs.niu.edu *
* Columnist: Pramod K. Mishra pkm@acpub.duke.edu *
* SCN Correspondent: Rajesh Shrestha (Open Position) rajs@aleph0.clarku.edu *
* *
* TND Archives: http://library.wustl.edu/~listmgr/tnd/ *
* TND Foundation: http://www.nepal.org info-tnd@nepal.org *
* WebSlingers: Pradeep Bista,Naresh Kattel,Robin Rajbhandari,Prakash Bista*
* webmaster-tnd@nepal.org *
* *
* +++++ Food For Thought +++++ *
* *
* "Heros are the ones who give a bit of themselves to the community" *
* "Democracy perishes among the silent crowd" -Sirdar_Khalifa *
* *
******************************************************************************
******************************************************************
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 11:10:29 EDT
To: tnd@nepal.org
From: Roger Smith <rsmith@supernova.net>
Subject: People's Review: MAY 22, 1997:Jigme insults Nepal
Jigme insults Nepal
by PUSHPA RAJ PRADHAN
Jigme Singhe Wanchuwk, king of Bhutan, is intentionally insulting
Nepal from time to time.
On the other hand, our government is giving unnecessary privilege
to Bhutan while accepting Bhutan as a member of regional grouping.
In the SAARC summit in Male, the Bhutani king stated in his speech
that his country, in the southern part, is suffering the problem of
immigrants which has resulted in deforestation and has badly
affected the environment. That means that he deliberately wanted to
prove that those refugees residing in Nepal were Nepalese who
entered Bhutan as immigrants. Apart from that, the Bhutani king, in
an interview to the Wall Street Journal, has said that those
Bhutanese Refugees were no one else than Nepalese who illegally
came and stayed in the southern part of Bhutan. Noteworthy is that,
in that interview, king Jigme has insulted Nepal stating that Nepal
is a poor country and she always seeks foreign aid.
You (Westerners) please give aid to Nepal, Jigme said. Everybody
knows that the Bhutani King is ruling the country in a brutal way
and he had deliberately forced out citizens who wanted to introduce
democracy in the country. Not only the people of Nepalese origin,
but also, Lepcha and Bhutia are also involved in the movement for
democracy. But the king is trying to hide the reality manipulating
the Indian as well as western media and politicians. Those
westerners, as well as Indians, who are always pleading for
democracy in the world, why are they not putting pressure to the
last dictator of the world? Why is he allowed to lie to the world?
More surprising is that, why Nepal chooses such a partner to go
ahead in the sub-regiona cooperation?
******************************************************************
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 14:15:45 GMT
To: tnd@nepal.org
From: carin@gn.apc.org (H. Brown)
Subject: "Murder No Crime."
Hello,
Thanks for this answer. I am attaching a post at the foot of this e-mail.
Regards
H. Brown.
MURDER NO CRIME IF VICTIM A WOMAN.
Sarita Adhikari disappeared at one on Sunday afternoon.
Tokha villages heard her screams about half past one in the
afternoon below Tokha, but fearing the cries to be the
ghost of a woman who had died in the same location earlier
this year, they did not investigate. Early Sunday
afternoon, a farmer found Sarita's strangled body, fresh
blood dribbling from her nose.
Arriving to investigate, Sub-inspector Gopal Prasad Dhakal
- recently jailed in connection with the December 15th rape
in the Budhanilkanta police station - immediately handled
Sarita's body and freely trampled the area. The Local
Development Committee warned him that the body should not
be touched, but Dhakal said, "I am the Sub-inspector; there
is nothing wrong in me handling the body."
The daughter in law of Gaju Raj Joshi then told Dhakal, "Do
not bring the dogs, they will come to our house." Dhakal
answered, "As so many people have been coming and going
there is no sense bringing the dogs anyway." Joshi is
reported to have previously threatened the lives of several
other women for their activism, and after the murder
villagers were so terrified by his threats that most
refused to speak about the murder.
The Teaching Hospital doctor who handled the autopsy is
said to have initially announced that Sarita had been both
raped and strangled. On Monday morning the Office of the
District Superintendent of Police announced that she had
not been raped and forced her family to cremate the remains
as fast as possible.
Sub-inspector A.B. Khadkha had called the victim of the
alleged rape by Sub-inspector Dhakal in the Budhanilkanta
police station on December 15th a "pross" with a "bad
character". However, in her public testimony in the 22
December town meeting in Budhanilkanta, Savitri Gurung, a
police sergeant's wife who had given the victim lodging,
stated the victim was not a prostitute but had taken
lodging with her.
This victim originally approached the police to recompense
unpaid wages from the owner of the carpet factory. In
obvious difficulty, alone, and making demands on powerful
businessmen, she was evidently perceived as an easy target
by Sub-inspector Dhakal. Insinuation of immoral behaviour
to rape victims shifts scrutiny from the suspect's crime
and reputation - as a boozer and woman abuser in Dhakal's
case.
On 14th December Dhakal made sexually explicit jokes to the
victim and told her to return in the evening. Justifiably
frightened, she did not go. At 8.45 the next night, on
pretext of "investigation", several policemen, claiming
that Dhakal had ordered them to fetch her forcibly, pulled
the victim from under the bed where she was hiding and
dragged her away. To Savitri Gurung's request that they
take her the next morning, they answered, "She must be
reported to the D.S.P.'s office tonight itself."
On the morning of the 16th, the police told Savitri Gurung
to fetch the victim not from the D.S.P.'s Office, where she
had never reached, but from the police station. Savitri
Gurung found the victim sitting, clothes torn, face
scratched. Sobbing, she said, "I have been raped. That
Inspector [Dhakal] kicked me twice in the stomach, beat me,
then raped me.
The police description of the large crowd that then came,
as " "communist hooligans" who sought to embarrass the
local government," begs the question of why the local
government members themselves spearheaded the complaint
against the police or why they were prevented from
accompanying or gaining further access to the victim once
they brought her to the D.S.P.'s office. The D.S.P.'s
office told the committee members that in lieu of next of
kin the committee members must submit an official request
from their office to receive the victim back into their
custody. Meanwhile she was spirited "back home to her
parents" says the D.S.P.'s office, without evidence that
she arrived alive.
The police arrested and beat the two men who first released
the information on the Budhanilkanta case. According to Dr
Mathura Shrestha of the Forum for the Protection of Human
Rights, the police issued warrants for seven others who
delivered information. According to "Nepali Patra", Rajeesh
Kardka, Prakash Thakuri, Lal Bahadur Tamang, and Dev Man
Gurung, [who photographed the abduction] have been arrested
and tortured in the Mahendra Police Club. Savitri Gurung's
husband was also transferred to shut up his wife.
The suspect Sub-inspector Dhakal is reported to have said,
"Nothing will happen to me because I am -'s man. [he
referred to a high elected official]. At most, I will be
transferred."
Although rapes are perpetrated against women in all
situations, both these victims in particular were
challenging the power structure. Sarita Adhiraki as a
member of the All Nepal Women's Association and the
Budhanilkanta victim by asking for unpaid wages.
In both cases, as generally characterises rape and other
forms of violence against women [wife beating, dowry
murders, child-rearing and career discrimination,
harassment, the lucrative business of amniocentesis and
prenatal "femicide" by doctors' etc] there is collusion
among the police and justice systems, doctors, political
leadership and a cowed, self-censured press.
The D.S.P.'s office was obsessed to demonstrate that rape,
as sexual intercourse, had not occurred, particularly one
in which they not only have been immediately complicit but
which seems to reflect more general policy and practice.
Women only gain citizenship rights - property, marital
residence, maternity - through men. Violence against women,
including forced marital intercourse, is a personal matter
between women and men. If rape can be shown not to have
occurred and, in the second case, the victim was a
prostitute, the D.S.P.'s office gets off the hook.
In the movement against rape growing world-wide over the
last two decades, women have found that political leaders
are more interested in rape as "just something to be used
in their political manoeuvres." Violence against women
underlies the same institutions upon which political power
as such is based. Women's representation in party
leadership and the parliament is negligible; they are
constitutionally excluded by birth from inheritance,
marriage residence and maternal citizenship rights; they do
66% to 80% of all the manual labour, but receive less than
10% of the income; they make up two-thirds of the poor and
90% of refugees. How else will such a large proportion of
any population universally submit to such degradation
except through institutional beating, rape and sexual
intercourse on demand, psychological harassment, social
devaluation and murder?
As this violence underlies all institutions, no party can
build a mass constituency without supporting it, unless its
members proceed from the start to build their organisation
by challenging and changing the institutions which base
themselves on violence against women, including parties and
middle class women's N.G.O.'s as they now stand.
Such activist organisation constitutes the world-wide anti-
rape movement. In Nepal, it first took form in the shape of
the Women's Defence Pressure group, which has brought about
58 urban women's groups in response to the growing
incidence of rapes in the last year. However, the Group has
still not begun to confront rape as necessary for society
in its existing form, possibly because the leadership are
themselves relatively privileged or have raised to
prominence due to the status of their husbands. Indeed the
political constituency of one of the Pressure Group's
leaders includes the suspects in Sarita's murder!
Thus so far, without diminishing the group's potential, its
leadership has oriented itself to delivering petitions to
ministers and garnering television shots, while
disregarding the concerns, demands and potential of the
women they claim to represent.
Much more significant, in my mind, is the town meeting
organised on 22nd December in Budhanilkanta to discuss the
recent rape there, in which the Group was notable by its
virtual absence. Though this meeting was oriented toward a
particular rape, the inevitable inability to gain redress
through government and parties, the subsequent warrants and
arrests of its organisers, and the police action presently
being taken, will encourage expansion of such direct
actions to changing more and more aspects of the society
itself; values, family, police, government, parties, Non-
Governmental Organisations, even the role of international
organisations and agencies.
This is a slow and agonising process, with many set-backs.
I do not foresee the suspects in the rapes of either Sarita
Adhikari or the Budhanilkanta victim being soon brought to
justice, despite the seriousness of their crimes - all the
actors involved have too much to lose, and women and
conscious men are themselves just beginning to educate
themselves and organise.
However, each such confrontation will lead more and more
numbers of women and men to increasingly see that women's
personal experiences of violence are tied up with the entire
arrangement of society and to learn more and more how to
organise themselves and change it for the better for all.
>>>>>>
(First published in The Independent, Nepal, on 6th January
1993. I wonder if anything has changed?)
The writer, Dr Stephen Mikesell, an American scholar, had
been living in Kathmandu for some years at the time of
writing this article. I have met him and some of the people
concerned in these situations. The murdered girl's brother
asked for our help.
Posted by H. Brown: carin@gn.apc.org
--"All that is necessary for evil to succeed
is for good men to do nothing."
--Edmund Burke 1729 -1797
******************************************************************
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 00:10:05 +0700 (GMT)
To: The Nepal Digest <nepal@cs.niu.edu>
Subject: Nepali Constitution Analysis
Forwarded by: Rajpal Jwala Pratap Singh <a10rjs1@cs.niu.edu>
[This article is copyrighted by Himalayan Research Bulletin. Vol. XI,
Nos. 1-3. 1991. ASNIC is grateful to the Editor of the Bulletin, and to
Ter Ellingson for giving their permission to reproduce it in the ASNIC Web.]
The Nepal Constitution of 1990: Preliminary Considerations
Ter Ellingson
The Nepal constitution of 23 Kartik, 2047 V.S. (November 9, 1990 A.D.) is a
bold attempt to institutionalize the goals of the popular movement of the
Spring of 1990. In a dramatic reversal of previous formulations, it places
sovereignty in the people and makes the king the symbol of the nation, thus
legally transforming the state from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy.
It reinstates the system of multiparty democracy absent since the brief
democratic experiment of the 1950's, and presents guarantees of new basic
rights. The subsequent completion of elections and formation of a new
Government according to its provisions, even with the problems and conflicts
common to such fundamental political restructurings, have provided decisive
steps towards transforming it from a theoretical document to a living
reality.
The 1990 constitution will affect first of all the lives of the people of
Nepal, but also will have its effects on the work of scholars who do research
in Nepal, whether or not their fields of study center on contemporary politics.
As an institutional, and in some sense revolutionary, manifestation of the
worldwide pro-democracy movements of the early 1990's, the Nepal constitution
should also be of interest to scholars of other areas and general theorists
interested in political change and democratic movements. Its full significance
and effects will not be known for some time to come; but even at an early stage
of its implementation and interpretation, it raises issues that deserve
preliminary consideration.
Structure and Models
The new Nepal constitution is a complex document which includes a preamble, 133
articles grouped into 23 parts, and 3 appended schedules:
Preamble
Part 1: Preliminary
Part 2: Citizenship
Part 3: Fundamental Rights
Part 4: Directive Principles and Policies of the State
Part 5: His Majesty
Part 6: Raj Parishad
Part 7: Executive
Part 8: Legislature
Part 9: Legislative Procedure
Part 10: Financial Procedure
Part 11: Judiciary
Part 12: Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority
Part 13: Auditor-General
Part 14: Public Service Commission
Part 15: Election Commission
Part 16: Attorney-General
Part 17: Political Organisations
Part 18: Emergency Power
Part 19: Amendment of the Constitution
Part 20: Miscellaneous
Part 21: Transitional Provisions
Part 22: Definitions and Interpretation
Part 23: Short Title and Commencement
Schedule 1<b>: </b>National Flag
Schedule 2<b>: </b>National Anthem
Schedule 3<b>: </b>Coat-Of-Arms
The first four parts deal with primary issues and definitions of the state,
sovereignty, citizenship, rights and policies. Parts 5 and 6 are concerned
with the King and the council on royal affairs,known as the Raj Parishad.
Parts 8-11 cover the 3 main branches of government: executive, legislative and
judiciary; and parts 12-16 have to do with major investigative and
administrative commissions and offices. The remaining sections, parts 17-23,
relate to various issues and institutions not covered in the other parts,
ranging from one-time issues concerning the transition between old and new
constitutions, to technical definitions; of special note here are the
provisions regarding political parties (Part 17), a crucial issue in the 1990
demonstrations that gave rise to the new constitution, and the emergency powers
provisions of Part 18, providing for temporary suspensions of political rights
in times of crisis.
While the organization of the constitution generally seems straightforward, the
seven-article Part 1, labeled "Preliminary", at first glance might seem a
random collection of subjects ranging from the vital and profound to the
near-trivial:
Part 1: Preliminary
1.Constitution as the Fundamental Law<p>
2.The Nation [=people irrespective of religion, race, caste or tribe]<p>
3.The Sovereignty [vested in the Nepalese people]<p>
4.The Kingdom [multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent, indivisible
and sovereign Hindu Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom; territory of Nepal]
5.National Flag
6.Language of the Nation [Nepali="language of the nation" and official
language; all languages spoken as mother tongue in Nepal are "national
languages"
7.National Anthem etc. [national flower, national color, national animal,
national bird, coat of arms,including its enlargement or reduction and
color.
Some of the subjects covered here are so vitally important that blood has been
shed and lives sacrificed on their behalf, both during the 1990 democracy
uprising and in earlier times. And yet, none of these subjects are trivial:
after all, blood has been shed and governments challenged on behalf of the
national animal, the cow, as well.
While Americans may have adopted
the bald eagle as their national symbol after the completion of their first
constitution and waited nearly two centuries to give it protection from
killing,<a href="nepconstanalysis_fn.html#fn1">[2]</a> the many centuries of
symbolic importance and protection of the cow before the adoption of any
written constitution in Nepal shows both the precedence and the significance of
factors that some societies might regard as "only" symbolic. Indeed, the range
of discourse in these preliminary sections is of the nature not only of a
voicing of universal democratic principles, but also of a dialog on the symbols
which give shape, significance and legitimacy to nearly every important
feature, including political institutions and processes, in a Hindu-Buddhist
society (cf. Errington 1989). Their placement in a leading section of the
constitution, rather than being tacked on at the end, speaks to the ongoing
vitality of such symbols in a culturally unique context, as well as to a
certain continuity with the cultural past.
With its 133 articles, the Nepal constitution is considerably longer and more
complex than the U.S. constitution (1789/1979), with its 7 articles and 26
amendments, and much shorter and simpler in stucture than the Indian
constitution (1950/1983) with its 395 articles, 10 schedules, and 3 appendices.
It closely approximates the constitution of the People's Republic of China
(1982/1987) in number of articles (the Chinese constitution has 138); but,
owing to greater length and complexity of the articles, the Nepal constitution
is perhaps two to three times longer than the Chinese. In overall comparison,
the Nepal constitution falls fairly high on the scale of length and complexity,
but below some others such as the Sri Lanka constitution (1978), to say nothing
of the Indian constitution, which forms a widely-recognized class in itself.<p>
Following a general rule to which the 1990 Nepal constitution is no exception,
length and complexity increase with the amount of detail of administrative law
and procedures superimposed on the more widespread and basic prescriptions of
principles and governing structures shared by all constitutions. Thus, for
example, not only do over half of the 24 articles of the section of the Nepal
constitution which deal with the legislature (Part 8, Articles 44-67) concern
matters of procedure, but also the entire section is followed by two more
sections with an additional 16 articles (Parts 9-10, Articles 68-83) devoted
entirely to procedural matters. While shorter constitutions leave
administrative and procedural details to be worked out by means such as enacted
laws, legal challenges and test cases, custom and consensus, longer
constitutions with explicit prescriptions of such details embed them in the
basic law of the land. It can be expected that in such cases, procedures are
more difficult to adjust and adapt to changing circumstances, as a
constitutional amendment would theoretically be required in every case. On the
other hand, constitutional encoding of such details can provide safeguards
against easy abuses and arbitrary changes in procedure at the administrative
level. Whether this additional protection is worth the tradeoff in procedural
rigidity and resistance to change remains to be seen.<p>
In its length, complexity and detail of attention to administrative and
procedural matters, the Nepal constitution seems to bear a family resemblance
to the constitutions of neighboring South Asian countries influenced by the
long and complex Indian constitution. For example, both the content and
phrasing of the list of "fundamental rights" given in Part 3, together with the
limitations placed on those rights, show considerable resemblances to the
corresponding Part 3 of the Indian constitution. Some of the formulations
regarding caste, including provisions for protection and affirmative action on
behalf of castes victimized by past discrimination, also suggest borrowing from
an Indian model. Other indications of Indian influence include, for example,
the list of "directive principles and policies of the state" (Part 4, Articles
24-26; cf. India 1950/1983 Part 4, Articles 36-51), which, as in the nearly
identical words of the Indian constitution, in principle "shall be fundamental
to the activities and governance of the State", but which in practice "shall
not be enforceable in any court." <p>
Such resemblances notwithstanding, influences of the Indian and other
neighboring constitutions are less important in the overall balance than might
be expected. The Nepal constitution describes a different type of state: a
constitutional monarchy rather than an elected-head-of-state republic, a "Hindu
kingdom" rather than a secular state, and a society in which ethnic contrasts
and interactions play at least as important a role as those of caste, to the
extent that the two can be separated in Nepal's complexly distinctive social
mosaic. While the original impetus behind the creation of India's constitution
was to replace foreign colonial domination with an internally-based democratic
alternative, the impetus toward creating the Nepal constitution was to replace
one kind of internal regime with another, more democratic kind. Four decades'
experience with self-government in the post-colonial world provided a much
wider range of examples than had been available to the framers of the Indian
constitution; and Nepal's constitution reflects the wider range of experiences
and models available to its framers. Thus, for example, in direct response to
the results of political experiments in the developing world, the Nepal
constitution explicitly prohibits not only laws establishing a one-party state,
but even participation in elections by parties advocating them (Article
112/2-3). On the other hand, apparently in response to controversies of
constitutional interpretation in the industrialized world, it explicitly
guarantees the right of privacy. And the guarantee of a right to information
(Article 16) reflects a sophisticated awareness of the political implications
of contemporary world trends that seems far less likely to have been included
even a decade or two earlier.<p>
If the Nepal constitution is not a clone of the Indian, neither is it of the
Chinese nor of any other single or dominant prototype. A Communist member of
the framing commission suggests that the postwar Japanese constitution was the
most influential foreign model because of its example of a workable system of
constitutional monarchy (private communication); but the Nepal constitution is
as fundamentally different from Japan's constitution as it is from those of
India, China, the U.S., or any other single country. Nor is there a single
ideological model: it expresses, for example, a high degree of concern with
social and economic rights and welfare of ordinary people and disadvantaged
groups, while still maintaining a right to property. Reflecting a broad
awareness of political, economic and ideological diversity and change in the
world at large, the 1990 Nepal constitution is as complexly related to its
counterparts in other nations as it is to its most direct model, the previous
Nepal constitution, with which it shares fundamental similarities and
differences.
Popular Sovereignty, Constitutionalism and Constitutional Monarchy
The new constitution explicitly identifies sovereignty as "vested" and
"inherent" in the Nepalese people. The basic formulation on the subject is
contained in Part 1, Article 3:<p>
The Sovereignty: The sovereignty of Nepal is vested in the Nepalese
people and shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution. (Article 3)
This seemingly simple statement has complex and powerful implications. Some of
these can be seen in a comparison of the preambles of the 1962 and 1990
constitutions, where sovereign powers formerly "inherent in" the King,
"devolved on Us" by inheritance "from Our August and Revered Forefathers" are
now defined as inherent in the people, with authorities to be "exercised by"
the King "in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution." The
transfer of sovereignty to the people, then, is the cornerstone on which the
new structure of a constitutional monarchy is to be erected.
PREAMBLE 1962 Constitution: Whereas it PREAMBLE 1990 Constitution: Whereas We
is desirable in the best interest and are convinced that in the independent
for all-round progress of the kingdom and sovereign Nepal, the source of
of Nepal and of the Nepalese people to authority is inherent in conduct the
government of the country in consonance people, and, therefore, we have from
with the popular will; ...And whereas time to time, made known our desire
the happiness and prosperity of Our to conduct the government of
beloved subjects have always been Our objective the country in consonamce
only for the accomplishment of which we with the popular will
are solemnly resolved;
Now, therefore, I, King Mahendra Bir Now, therefore, keeping in view the
Bikram Shah Deva, in exercise of the desire of the people that the state
sovereign powers and prerogatives authority and sovereign powers shall,
inherent in Us according to the after the, commencement of this
constitutional law, custom and usage exercised in accordance with the
of Our country and which devolved on provisions constitution, be of this
Us from Our August and Revered constituion, I, King Birendra Bir
Forefathers, do hereby enact and Bikram Shah Deva, by virtue of the
promulgate this Constitution. State authority as exercised by Us,
do hereby Enact and Promulgate this
CONSTITUTION OF KINGDOM OF NEPAL by
and with the advice and consent of
the Council of Ministers.
Popular
sovereignty, a controversial issue in the adoption of the constitution, thus
would seem to guarantee a democratic basis of government. Yet, U.S. readers,
at least, may experience a moment of cognitive dissonance when projecting their
experience of a constitution based on popular sovereignty that begins "We, the
people..." with the Nepal constitution which begins and is promulgated via the
Royal rather than the popular "we". The British constitutional concept of
legislative sovereignty is not explicitly cited in the constitution, although
some provisions may seem to presuppose it -- and, in general, language
comparable to the U.S. constitution's "Congress shall make no law regarding..."
is not used. Rather, such sovereignty-restricting language is
characteristically applied to unnamed protagonists, whether groups or
individuals, in a wide range of provisions to the effect that "Questions
regarding [x action by His Majesty and/or the government] shall not be raised
in any court" -- a seemingly fundamental and potentially crippling limitation
to popular sovereignty, although its real significance will only be worked out
in practice.<p>
The meaning of popular sovereignty in the transition from an absolute to a
constitutional monarchy, of course, hinges on the establishment of democratic
institutions and powers, and the nature and extent to which the formerly
sovereign powers of the monarch have been limited, transferred to other organs
of government, and/or subjected to constitutional checks and balances. Such a
process of intentional constitutional delineation of controls and limits on the
arbitrary or one-sided exercise of power, or <i>constitutionalism</i>, is an
impetus behind the creation of many constitutions; in Nepal in 1990, its
particular focus was on the constitutionalization of a formerly absolute
monarchy. Thus, in the new constitution, the former royal "sovereign powers
and prerogatives inherent in Us" have formally devolved to "the State authority
as exercised by Us," subject to "the desire of the people that the state
authority and sovereign powers shall... be exercised in accordance with the
provisions of this Constitution;" and the King's status, at least in theory,
has become a symbolic one:
His Majesty is the symbol of the Nepalese nationality and the unity of
the Nepalese people. His Majesty is to preserve and protect this
Constitution by keeping in view the best interests and welfare of the people of
Nepal. (Article 27)
Yet His Majesty's role under the 1990 constitution is hardly restricted to
symbolism. He is given explicit status as a part of two of the three branches
of government, executive and legislative; and his powers extend to the
judiciary branch in more than symbolic ways.<p>
Articles 35 and 44 give the king formal status as a part of both the executive
and legislative branches.
The executive power of the Kingdom of Nepal shall, pursuant to this
Constitution and other laws, be vested in His Majesty and the Council of
Ministers. (Article 35/1)
There shall be a Legislature, to be called Parliament, which shall consist of
His Majesty and two Houses, namely the House of Representatives and the
National Assembly. (Article 44)<p>
Although the language of these formulations seems to imply equal status and
balance of powers between the king and elected officials, subsequent clauses
make it clear that real checks and limitations have been placed on royal
powers:<p>
Except as otherwise expressly provided as to be exercised exclusively by His
Majesty or at His discretion or on the recommendation of any institution or
official, the powers of His Majesty under this Constitution shall be exercised
upon the recommendation and advice and with the consent of the Council of
Ministers. Such recommendation, advice and consent shall be submitted through
the Prime Minister. (Article 35/2)<p>
Thus, the king's "exercised" executive powers are subordinated to the
"inherent" authority of popular sovereignty, regulated and limited by the
recommendation, advice and consent of elected representatives. Although the
king appoints the Council of Ministers, he does so upon the recommendation of
the Prime Minister, who must be the leader of the majority party in the House
of Representatives, and who is directly responsible to it (Article 36). In
general, the king's executive powers are carefully circumscribed in Part 7, and
the primacy of elective representative government clearly spelled out in
clauses covering a broad range of contingencies. It is possible to envision
problems if some king, in the future, should be inclined to undemocratically
exploit potential loopholes such as the ability to temporarily appoint
unelected persons as Deputy Prime Minister or other ministers, their
eligibility for appointment as Prime Minister at the death or resignation of a
current Prime Minister, the dissolution of Parliament pending elections, or
other circumstances. Such a case, however unlikely it might be, would in any
event require special circumstances and complex manipulations of legal
subtleties that would seem less tempting than more direct forms of action.
But, barring the catastrophic, and assuming a normally functioning state and
society, the implementation of popular sovereignty and representative
government and the constitutionalization of monarchial powers seem as
straightforwardly and firmly established as under any parliamentary system.<p>
The king's legislative role is more complex. First of all, although the House
of Representatives is elected by popular vote, the National Assembly includes
members elected by the House of Representatives, regional representatives
elected by an electoral college of local authorities, and members appointed by
the king himself:<p>
The National Assembly shall consist of sixty members as follows: -
(a)ten members to be nominated by His Majesty from amongst persons of
high reputation who have rendered prominent service in various fields of
national life. (Article 46)
Under the Panchayat system established by the 1962 constitution (Article 34),
the king nominated 20% of the members of the National Panchayat; in the new
system, he appoints 17% (10 out of 60) of the members of one of the two houses.
Nevertheless, popular objections to the absolutism of the old system did not
focus so much on these direct appointees, but rather on the larger number
chosen by local authorities who were themselves viewed as subject to royal
manipulation. Under the old system, these constituted the other 80% of the
national legislature. In the new system, they are fifteen members, or 25%, of
one house (Article 46/1c), while a majority of 58% of that house, or 35 members
out of 60, are chosen by the elected House of Representatives. Obviously, the
potential for strong royal influence on the legislature is present, but not for
overriding the votes of elected representatives. Moreover, although both
houses must vote on legislation and work out differences in joint committees,
the House of Representatives may override the rejection of a bill by the
National Assembly, which includes the royal and local appointees, by a second
majority vote, and pass it directly to the king without the agreement of the
other house (Article 69/7).<p>
The king must give assent to bills in order for them to become law, but he does
not have veto power. He may send a bill back for further discussion; but if it
is again passed, he must give his assent within thirty days (Article 71/3-4).
Likewise, the king may promulgate ordnances on his own initiative when he
thinks immediate action is necessary while the houses of Parliament are not in
session; but Parliament may vote such ordnances out of existence as soon as
they meet in session, and even without such a vote, the ordnances become void
within six months (Article 72). Thus, in overall balance the king's
legislative powers seem clearly delimited and subordinated to democratic
institutions.<p>
Although the king is not formally defined as part of the judiciary, as he is
with the executive and legislative branches, he has the power to appoint
judges; and, although he must do so with the advice of various councils, their
members include judges he has previously appointed, allowing for the
possibility of a growth of cumulative influence over the years as other council
members change with the succession of changing elected governments. He is
supreme commander of the military, whose courts lie outside of the democratic
safeguards imposed on appointments to and decisions of the civil courts.
Moreover, he has sweeping powers to nullify the decisions of an otherwise
independent judiciary:<p>
His Majesty shall have the power to grant pardons and to suspend, commute or
remit any sentence passed by any court, special court, military court or by any
other judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative authority or institution.
(Article 122)
The most obvious untouched remnant of absolute power left to the king is that
of absolute legal immunity: "No question shall be raised in any court about
any act performed by His Majesty" (Article 31). However, such immunity is
hardly a unique privilege of the king; it also extends to Ministers, Parliament
and various government offices and commissions in matters such as the
government's failure to implement the "fundamental" constitutionally mandated
directive principles and policies (Article 24), recommendations or advice given
by the Council of Ministers "or any other institution or official" (Article
35), nonobservance of rules governing the conduct of government business
(Article 41), irregular proceedings in Parliament (Article 62), allocation of
election seats (Article 105), and, perhaps most ominously, the suspension of
fundamental rights during proclamations of emergency (Article 115). Thus, to
the extent that the constitution may contain potential weak spots and dangers
for popular sovereignty and democracy, they may lie in immunity from recourse
against abuses from forces in the government that are not confined to a
possible future resurgence of absolutism in the monarchy itself. On the other
hand, it is difficult to imagine how any government could function without some
kinds of immunities to safeguard against harassment and malicious interference.
Like the U.S. constitution's provisions for legislative immunities (Article 1,
Section 6: "...they shall not be questioned in any other place."), other
democratic countries provide legal immunities either within the text of
constitutional documents or elsewhere in the written and unwritten matrix of
constitutional principles and practices. In Nepal, as elsewhere, their
potential for democratic or undemocratic implementation will be worked out
within this larger matrix.
Emergency King
The most sweeping powers allocated to the King are those relating to a
proclamation of emergency:
Emergency Power: (1) If a grave crisis arises in regard to the sovereignty or
integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal or the security of any part thereof, whether
by war, external aggression, armed rebellion or extreme economic disarray, His
Majesty may, by Proclamation, declare or order a State of Emergency... (7)
After the State of Emergency has been declared... His Majesty may issue such
Orders as are necessary.... Orders so issued shall be operative with the same
force and effect as law so long as the State of Emergency is in operation.
(Article 115)<p>
As was the case under the 1962 constitution (Article 81), this article does not
require the King to consult with Parliament, the Prime Minister or any elected
official before issuing such a proclamation. On the other hand, while the old
constitution only stipulated that the King could subsequently consult
parliamentary officials regarding termination of a state of emergency "if he so
desires," the 1990 constitution requires an automatic review by Parliament
within a specified time limit:<p>
(2) Every Proclamation or Order issued under clause (1) above shall be laid
before a meeting of the House of Representatives for approval within three
months from the date of issuance. (3) If a Proclamation or Order laid for
approval pursuant to clause (2) is approved by a two-thirds majority of the
House of Representatives present at that meeting, such Proclamation or Order
shall continue in force for a period of six months from the date of issuance.
(Article 115)<p>
Thus, although the King's emergency powers are virtually unlimited at the time
of a proclamation of emergency, they are temporary and subject to overrule by
elected representatives in the long run. There is no provision for the
extension of a state of emergency beyond one year, although here, as in other
situations, tampering and abuse could be imagined. As with most such
questions, the real significance of the Emergency Power article will only be
seen in actual practice; but its potential effects on democracy and rights are
crucial, and it deserves careful attention (see page 000 below).<p>
In overall balance, the constitutional monarchy established by the 1990
constitution may seem rather strongly inclined in the direction of monarchy,
but not uniquely so. If we compare, for example, the constitution of Norway
(Norway 1814/1962), we find virtually the same guarantee of legal immunity as
in the Nepal constitution:<p>
The King's person shall be sacred; he cannot be blamed or accused. (Norway
1814/1962: Article 5)<p>
Moreover, the Norwegian constitution gives the King an apparent monopoly over
power in the executive branch, seemingly in disregard of elected
representatives:<p>
The King himself chooses a Council of Norwegian citizens... The Council shall
consist of a Prime Minister and at least seven other members.... The King
shall apportion the business among the members of the Council of State, as he
deems suitable. On extraordinary occasions, the King may summon other
Norwegian citizens to take a seat in the Council of State, ...but no member of
the [Parliament] may be summoned thus. (Norway 1814/1962: Article 12)<p>
Nevertheless, as the editor of the English edition of the Norwegian
constitution (1814/1962: 19) informs us, "Since 1884 the King has always
chosen Councils which have enjoyed the confidence of the Storting [Parliament].
It must be considered a firm constitutional custom that a Government is bound
to resign if the Storting makes clear that it desires a change of government."
The instance clearly shows that in actual practice, unwritten practice may
carry equal or greater constitutional weight than written provisions, and that
"constitutions" extend further than their documentary manifestations, an issue
we shall return to below. With regard to the issue of constitutional monarchy,
the Norwegian case shows that a strong dose of monarchialism in a
constitution's written provisions is not necessarily a bar to popular
sovereignty or the democratic control of monarchial powers in the full
constitutional matrix of written and unwritten provisions and procedures,
established principles and institutions and changing circumstances -- for there
are few who would maintain that the royalist language written into the
Norwegian constitution has produced a correspondingly undemocratic state. The
Nepal constitution, with less strong but still appreciable monarchialist
tendencies counterbalanced by stronger constitutionalist and democratic
provisions, is likewise embedded in a larger constitutional matrix that will
shape the ultimate significance of its written provisions in ways yet to be
revealed.
The 1990 constitution establishes new rights for the people of Nepal, and
preserves others guaranteed under the 1962 constitution. The thirteen articles
of Part 3 provide for the protection of certain "Fundamental Rights": the
rights to equality (Article 11), freedom (12), press and publication (13),
regarding criminal justice (14), against preventive detention (15), to
information (16), property (17), cultural and educational right (18), to
religion (19), against exploitation (20), against exile (21), to privacy (22),
and the right to constitutional remedy of abuses (23). Some of these articles
include specifications of further rights. For example, Article 12, which
begins by prohibiting unlawful deprivation of personal liberty and capital
punishment, goes on to guarantee five freedoms: (a) freedom of opinion
and expression; (b) freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) freedom to form unions and associations; (d) freedom to move
throughout the Kingdom and reside in any part thereof; and (e) freedom to
practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, industry, or trade.<p>
Other rights are mentioned elsewhere in the constitution. For example, Article
26/6 says that "The State shall pursue a policy of increasing the participation
of the labour force, the chief socio-economic force of the country... ensuring
the right to work, and thus protecting its rights and interests." Some rights
are not explicitly designated as such, but are nevertheless implied and
established by prohibitions of their infringement. One of the most important
of such rights, established in Part 17 and especially Article 119, is that of
citizens to form political parties and participate in elections.<p>
This right to form political parties, of course, is a cornerstone of the 1990
constitution, the struggle for which was a primary cause of its coming into
existence. The establishment of such a right in the 1990 constitution required
the elimination of the 1962 constitution's Article 11/2a, a prohibition on
political parties, somewhat paradoxically inserted into the old constitution's
bill of rights. This section of the old constitution, also labelled "Part 3,"
was called "Fundamental Duties and Rights," and began with Article 9,
"Fundamental Duties of the Citizen," which required "devotion to the Nation and
loyalty to the State," along with exercising one's own rights with regard to
law and the rights of others, as duties of every citizen. This article on
duties was dropped, making Part 3 of the new constitution purely a bill of
rights.<p>
Many of the rights guaranteed in the 1990 constitution are carried over from
the 1962 constitution. These include the rights to equality (old constitution
Article 10, new 11); freedom, including a further specification of five
freedoms as in the new constitution (old Article 11, new 12); a right against
exile (old 12, new 21); against exploitation (old 13, new 20); to religion (old
14, new 19); property (old 15, new 17); and constitutional remedies (old 16,
new 23). Fundamental rights not specified as such in the old constitution, but
added to the new, include freedom of the press (new Article 13); the right
against preventive detention (15); the right "to demand and receive information
on any matter of public importance" (16); the cultural and educational rights
of "every community residing within the Kingdom of Nepal" (18), and the right
to privacy (22).<p>
Important changes have also been made in the provisions of some of the articles
carried over from the 1962 constitution dealing with these fundamental rights.
For example, a provision for affirmative action legislation to "protect or
promote the interests of" the disadvantaged has been inserted into Article 11,
along with a prohibition of caste discrimination against untouchables and a
guarantee of equal pay for the same work by men and women (11/3-5). Article
12/1 gains a prohibition on capital punishment, and Article 12/2e substitutes a
guarantee of "freedom to choose any profession, occupation, trade or to start
any industry" for the old constitution's freedom to acquire, enjoy or dispose
of property (old article 11/2e), a right guaranteed elsewhere in both
documents. Article 14 establishes as a separate right the freedom from police
and judicial abuses formerly included as subsections of the right to freedom
(old Article 11/3-8); and it adds a new prohibition on torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment (Clause 4). Article 19, Clause (2) adds
guarantees of rights of religious communities to those previously granted to
individuals; and Article 20/4 protects children agains hazardous employment.
All in all, the 1990 constitution provides for substantial gains in human
rights over and above those guaranteed in the 1962 constitution.<p>
However, the establishment of new rights and strengthening of old ones does not
represent an unqualified gain. In the majority of cases, the provision for a
right is followed by some kind of restrictions or limitations on that right,
some more extensive than others. For example, Article 20, the Right against
Exploitation, states:<p>
Traffic in human beings, slavery, serfdom or forced labour in any form
is prohibited. Any contravention of this provision shall be punishable by
law;... (2) No minor shall be employed in work in any factory or mine, or
be engaged in any other hazardous work. (Article 20)<p>
This statement of the right is followed by a simple qualification:<p>
Provided that nothing herein shall be a bar to providing by law for compulsory
service for public purposes.
On the other hand, the complexly formulated "Right to Freedom" (Article 12),
with its embedded list of freedoms (see above), contains a list of
qualifications considerably longer than the list of freedoms they qualify:<p>
Provided that - (1) nothing in sub-clause (a) [the freedom of opinion and
expression] shall be deemed to prevent the making of laws to impose reasonable
restrictions on any act which may undermine the sovereignty and integrity of
the Kingdom of Nepal, or which may jeopardize the harmonious relations
subsisting among the peoples of various castes, tribes or communities, or on
any act of sedition, defamation, contempt of court or incitement to an offence;
or on any act which may be contrary to decent public behaviour or morality;
(2) nothing in sub-clause (b) [the freedom to assemble] shall be deemed to
prevent the making of laws to impose reasonable restrictions on any act which
may undermine the sovereignty, integrity or law and order situation of the
Kingdom of Nepal; (3) nothing in sub-clause (c) [the freedom to form
unions and associations] shall be deemed to prevent the making of laws to
impose reasonable restrictions on any act which may undermine the sovereignty
and integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal, which may jeopardize the harmonious
relations subsisting among the peoples of various castes, tribes or
communities, which may instigate violence, or which may be contrary to public
morality; (4) nothing in sub-clause (d) [the freedom to move] shall be
deemed to prevent the making of laws which are in the interest of the general
public, or which are made to impose reasonable restrictions on any act which
may jeopardize the harmonious relations subsisting among the peoples of various
castes, tribes or communities; (5) nothing in sub-clause (e) [the freedom
to practice any profession, occupation, industry, or trade] shall be deemed to
prevent the making of laws to impose restriction on any act which may be
contrary to public health or morality, to confer on the State the exclusive
right to undertake specified industries, businesses or services; or to impose
any condition or qualification for carrying on any industry, trade, profession
or occupation. (Article 12)<p>
These detailed restrictions on specific rights are a new feature in the 1990
constitution, replacing a long list of qualifications and restrictions
applicable to rights in general inserted at the end of Part 3 of the old
constitution (Nepal 1962/1976: Article 17). Despite the use of language broad
enough to create a certain potential for abuse, in most cases these
qualifications and limitations on rights seem reasonable safeguards against
potential dangers to individuals, communities or the people at large, or
necessities for maintaining a functioning government; and most such
restrictions, in fact, are common practice in democratic societies.
Nevertheless, there are considerable contrasts between countries in the
constitutional formulation of the balance between rights and restrictions. In
the U.S. constitution, for example, rights are generally stated in absolute
form, without qualifications, with limitations established outside the written
constitution by enacted laws, case law and precedents, and customary practice.
It might legitimately be asked whether such an absolute, unqualified statement
of rights may create expectations and encourage practices which strengthen
those rights and place the burden on those who would limit them; or whether, on
the other hand, the automatic inclusion of qualifications and limitations in
statements of rights might weaken them and encourage their suppression. <p>
The evidence from comparative cases is inconclusive, but suggests otherwise.
The U.S. constitution, while tending towards unqualified statements of rights,
nevertheless specifies some restrictions, including a provision for suspending
<i>habeas corpus</i> "...when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it" (Article 1, Section 9)
and several amendments in the Bill
of Rights (Amendments 1-10) specify similar exceptions or include "except as
prescribed by law" clauses. The constitution of Canada takes the somewhat
different approach, resembling that of the 1962 Nepal constitution, of listing
specific rights without qualifications in its "Canadian Charter of Rights and
Customs" (Canada 1982/1983: Part 1), but frames this list between an opening
statement that such rights are subject "to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" (Section
1), and a concluding provision that the national Parliament or a provincial
legislature may enact laws which "shall operate notwithstanding a provision
included in" the Charter of Rights itself (Section 33). Despite the seemingly
crippling language of Section 33, it seems unlikely that Canadians are any less
secure in their constitutional rights than citizens of the U.S., with its more
absolute language. On the other hand, the constitution of the People's
Republic of China (China 1982/1987: Chapter 2, Articles 33-56) includes some
unqualified statements of rights in absolute terms reminiscent of the U.S.
Constitution:<p>
Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the
press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration (Article
35; cf. U.S. constitution 1789/1979, Amendment 1)<p>
But in actual practice, the implementation and exercise of such rights is not
absolute in either country, and in fact differs to almost the greatest extent
imaginable in the two countries. It would seem that the presence or absence of
qualifications in constitutional statements of rights is at best a secondary
factor which, if it has significant impact on practice, operates in the context
of much more important factors in the larger constitutional matrix of written
and unwritten principles and practices. Thus, although unqualified statements
of rights may produce a more positive impression of their strength and
importance in a particular society, while frequent qualifications and limits as
in the new Nepal constitution may evoke the impression of a distrust or
uneasiness about rights, nevertheless the highly qualified rights of the Nepal
constitution may, in the process of implementation and interpretation over the
course of time, prove as strong and important, or even more so, than those
stated in more absolute terms elsewhere.
One factor which may prove crucial in this process, because of the danger it
seems to present, is the issue of suspension of rights during a state of
emergency (see also page 000 above). Article 115 allows for broad suspensions
of rights in such emergencies
If a grave crisis arises in regard to the sovereignty or integrity of the
Kingdom of Nepal or the security of any part thereof, whether by war, external
aggression, armed rebellion or extreme economic disarray, His Majesty may, by
Proclamation, declare or order a State of Emergency....(8) His Majesty may, at
the time of making a Proclamation or Order of a State of Emergency pursuant to
clause (1), suspend sub-clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e) of clause (2) of Article
12, clause (1) of Article 13 and Articles 15, 16, 17, 22 and 23 of this
Constitution for as long as the Proclamation is in operation: Provided that
the right to the remedy of <i>habeas corpus</i> under Article 23 shall not be
suspended. (Article 115)
In the 1962 constitution's emergency powers provisions (Article 81), the King
could suspend "all or any" articles of the constitution. In the 1990
constitution, the rights subject to suspension under emergency proclamations
are limited in number; they include: Article 12, the right to freedom's Clause
2a, freedom of opinion and expression; 2b, freedom to assemble
peaceably and without arms; 2d, freedom to move throughout the Kingdom and
reside anywhere; and 2e, freedom to practice any profession, occupation,
industry, or trade; as well as the press and publication right, guaranteeing
freedom from censorship (Article 13); the right against preventive detention
(15); the right to information (16); the right to property (17); the right to
privacy (22); and the right to constitutional remedy against official
oppression and abuses (23). Individuals do, however, have recourse within
three months of termination of a proclamation of emergency to seek compensation
in court for "any damage... inflicted upon any person by an act of any official
which was done in contravention of law or in bad faith" during the emergency.
Except under these narrowly-defined circumstances, there is no legal remedy for
deprivation of rights:<p>
(9) In circumstances where His Majesty has suspended any Article of this
Constitution..., no petition may lie, nor question be raised in any court for
the enforcement of the fundamental right conferred by such Article. (Article
115)<p>
If the cumulative weight of restrictions and potential revocability of rights
suggests a certain air of authoritarianism, and the impression that the
constitution's "fundamental" rights are somewhat more insubstantial and
precarious than might be hoped for, it is no accident that much of this
impression comes from the Emergency Power article. Such provisions for
emergencies are both part of the necessary crisis-handling mechanisms of
democracies, and, as worldwide experience has shown, part of the most effective
political weaponry of aspiring autocrats and tyrants. It is obvious that the
occasional use of emergency powers elsewhere to topple democracies does not
make them any more a candidate for elimination than other institutions that
have brought down democracies, such as armies or elections. Nevertheless,
because emergency powers are by nature authoritarian and rights-restricting,
their use in democracies would seem to call for special safeguards against
misuse. In the lengths to which the Nepal constitution has gone to protect the
government against disruptions by its own citizens, both in emergencies and in
the restriction of rights under everyday non-crisis conditions, it is difficult
to imagine what place those rights now occupy on the continuum between
political/legal efficacy and quasi-mythical ideological symbolism. This issue
remains one of the more perplexing and crucial questions in the transition to
the new constitution.
Caste, Language, Religion
One of the most pervasive problems of modern world politics has been the
difficulty of reconciling 19th-century European ideals of the ethnic and
cultural homogeneity in the "nation-state" with 20th-century realities of
multiethnic and multicultural polities.
In the decades following the
mid-20th-century wave of decolonization, many writers assumed assumed this
problem to be particularly characteristic of the newly independent nations of
the Third World, stemming from the "artificial" creation of boundaries by
colonial powers. Experience in recent decades suggests that both ethnic and
cultural diversity and their associated problems are important political
factors in both industrialized and Third World countries, neither simply nor
characteristically associated with previously colonized states, because
homogeneity is rarely if ever found at levels beyond the smallest locality, and
hence "nations" and states are never contiguous. <p>
Thus, the problem for all modern states becomes one of creating and maintaining
a sense of "national" unity in a polity that is inherently transnational, that
is, multiethnic and multicultural. Nepal has confronted this problem
explicitly since the formation of a multiethnic state by Prthivi Narayan Shah
in the 1760's, and implicitly during the growth of the culturally diverse
Kathmandu Valley civilization in the preceding centuries. In the latest
attempt at formulating a definition of national identity, Article 2 of the 1990
constitution defines "the nation" as:<p>
Having common aspirations and united by a bond of allegiance to national
independence and integrity of Nepal, the Nepalese people irrespective of
religion, race, caste or tribe, collectively constitute the nation. (Article
2)<p>
The wording of the same article in the 1962 constitution was similar, except
that it had the people "united by the common bond of allegiance to the Crown"
(Nepal 1962: Article 2). The change is obviously part of the process of
constitutionalizing the monarchy and transferring sovereignty to the people.
Article 4 goes on to define the nature of the kingdom - i.e., the state:<p>
Nepal is a multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent, indivisible,
sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom. (Article 4)<p>
Here, besides the insertion of "Constitutional", we have three new terms not
included in the 1962 constitution's definition of the state: "multiethnic",
"multilingual", and "democratic". The incorporation of diversity into the
basic definition of the state reflects, on a larger scale, the worldwide 1990's
trend away from melting-pot ideologies in response to unsatisfactory
experiments with assimilationist and hegemonist treatment of minorities and
attempts to suppress or eliminate diversity. More directly, it reflects
Nepal's own experience with past attempts to impose a "national" identity based
on the cultural and linguistic heritage of only a few of the many
cultural-linguistic minorities who together constitute the population of the
country. Issues arising from sometimes draconian implementations of such
policies against other ethnic-cultural groups played a major role in the
accumulation of tensions that led to the pro-democracy outbreaks of 1990;
indeed, they were one of the problems for which democracy was demanded as a
solution. Thus, along with democracy and constitutionalism themselves, issues
of diversity relating to ethnic, caste, linguistic, religious and other
"communities" are crucial factors in the new constitution.<p>
The 1990 constitution's term Bahujâtîya, translated as
"multiethnic" in the official translation, is itself embedded in the
complexities of Nepal's diverse mosaic of ethnic, caste and other communities.
Article 11 presents us with this set of glosses for terms relating to such
communities:<p>
(1) All citizens shall be equal before law. No person shall be denied equal
protection of the laws. (2) No discrimination shall be made against any
citizen in the application of general laws on grounds of religion (dharma),
race (varya), sex (li_ga), caste (jât), tribe (jâti) or ideological
conviction (vaicârik) or any of them. (3) The State shall not
discriminate among citizens on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, tribe, or
ideological conviction or any of these. (Article 11/2)<p>
In everyday parlance, jât can be used to refer to either caste or ethnic
groups. This usage, more than the technical definitions of Article 11,
reflects the complex interplay of identities and ideologies resulting from the
historical imposition of caste concepts and practices upon an ethnically
diverse polity. As various scholars have pointed out, ethnic groups lack the
traditional occupational specializations and, hence, the hierarchy-generating
distinctions of habitual pure or impure conduct, that lie at the basis of the
Hindu caste system; they have no inherent place in the system, as they are
foreign to it. And yet, if the polity is to be ideologically, socially and
politically "Hindu," they must somehow be included in the system. Moreover,
since the historical basis of the "Hindu" polity includes the conquest and
subjugation of some Hindus, as well as non-Hindus, by Hindus of other ethnic
groups, the construction of a countrywide rationalized caste system has also
required the reshuffling of preexisting caste identities and hierarchies to
assure caste dominance by members of that caste with the proper ethnic and
cultural ties to the dominant ethnic group. Hence, the various attempts over
the centuries to assimilate non-Hindu ethnic groups to the system by
reification of customary behaviors (drinking alcohol, eating beef), and the
resulting confusions and contradictions, such as the treatment of Newars
sometimes considered as a single subordinate caste, and sometimes with
recognition of the complex stratification of the Newars' own traditional caste
hierarchies. Given such complexity and internal contradictions, the collapse
of the system may be unsurprising; but new constitutional initiatives built on
the base of such a complex heritage, combined with an impetus to democracy (cf.
Article 11's reference to "ideological conviction") and egalitarianism, raise
an even more compolex of issues that can only be touched on here.<p>
The tension between caste ideology and practices of dominance/subordination, on
the one hand, and democracy, egalitarianism and the protection of rights such
as equal treatment and non-discrimination, on the other, finds expression in
affirmative action provisions, some shared with the 1962 constitution and the
Indian constitution, and others new:<p>
Provided that special provisions may be made by law for the protection and
advancement of the interests of women, children, the aged or those who are
physically or mentally incapacitated or those who belong to a class which is
economically, socially or educationally backward. (4) No person shall, on the
basis of caste, be discriminated against as untouchable, be denied access to
any public place, or be deprived of the use of public utilities. Any
contravention of this provision shall be punishable by law. (5) No
discrimination in regard to remuneration shall be made between men and women
for the same work. (Article 11)<p>
In contrast to such provisions, with their emphasis on the rights of
individuals belonging to groups that have suffered negative impacts of past
practices, Article 18 introduces new provisions regarding the rights of
"communities" as a whole, expressed in positive terms:<p>
(1) Each community residing within the Kingdom of Nepal shall have the right
to preserve and promote its language, script and culture. (2) Each community
shall have the right to operate schools up to the primary level in its own
mother tongue for imparting education to its children. (Article 18)<p>
Such provisions serve as an antidote to the oppressive policies of the past and
a safeguard against their future resurgence, and provide a specific basis for
the "multiethnic, multilingual" definition of the kingdom in Article 4. The
written provisions in themselves would seem to do little towards the
realization of a linguistically and ethnically diverse state, insofar as they
refer specifically to private groups and institutions. However, reports of the
return of long-suppressed languages to state school curricula and media
broadcasts would suggest that, at least in regard to linguistic diversity
issues, the unwritten range of constitutional principles and practices are
developing in accord with the pluralist intent expressed in these provisions of
the written constitution. Whether an adequate basis has been established for
maintaining the balance between, on the one hand, the danger of regression into
oppressiveness and, on the other hand, the risk of mutation of diversity into
divisiveness and conflict, is as unsettled a question with Nepal as it is with
other countries faced with the late 20th century resurgence of ethnic
nationalism.<p>
Another obviously unsettled issue is that of religious diversity. Articles 2
and 11, among others, make reference to equal treatment of religions and the
right to practice one's own religion, a right spelled out in more detail in
Article 19:<p>
(1) Every person shall have the freedom to profess and practise his own
religion as handed down to him from ancient times having due regard to
traditional practices; provided that no person shall be entitled to convert
another person from one religion to another. (2) Every religious denomination
shall have the right to maintain its independent existence and for this purpose
to manage and protect its religious places and trusts. (Article 19)<p>
Yet there is at least an inherent logical contradiction between such provisions
as Article 2's definition of the nation as constituted by "the Nepalese people
irrespective of religion..." and Article 4's definition of the state as a
"Hindu kingdom", irrespective of the religious diversity of the Nepalese
people. Does this contradiction in the identities of the nation and the state
undermine either the integrity of the state itself, or the religious freedom of
its people? The answer is not entirely clear. While "separation of church and
state" as in the U.S. constitution provides a strong support for religious
freedom, it is by no means the only available choice for democratic countries.
England, for example, has its Established Church headed by the King or Queen,
as does Norway. The Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978), while guaranteeing
freedom of religion (Articles 10, 14), nevertheless gives Buddhism "the
foremost place" and requires the state "to protect and foster" it (Article 9).
Church-state relations and the conflicts that may arise out of them take many
forms and degrees of severity, and no simple relationship seems to exist
between the latter and written constitutional provisions. Thus, the seemingly
hands-off language of the U.S. constitution has not prevented problems such as
widespread suppression of American Indian religious practices, or conflicts
over attempts to restrict Santeria and other religions from practicing ritual
sacrifice -- an attack on religious freedom to which some traditional Nepal
Hindus would likewise be vulnerable were they to attempt to practice their
religion in the U.S. And some constitutionally-defined "secular" states such
as India have not been strangers either to religious conflict or to accusations
of state complicity and partiality. <p>
Nevertheless, the establishment of a religion also establishes an inevitable
formal inequality which implies some risk of discrimination, of whateverr
degree of mildness or severity; and which undercuts national unity, necessarily
based on perceptions of common heritage and aspirations, to the extent that
those outside the established religion feel themselves excluded from or
peripheral to a defining characteristic of national identity. Could such
problems be averted by including a provision similar to this one in the Indian
constitution?<p>
Explanation II. - ...the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a
reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the
reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.
(India 1950/1983: Article 25)<p>
A similar provision for Nepal might read:
Reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons
professing the Buddhist, Shamanist or other religions existing in Nepal over
the course of many centuries, and references to Hindu religion and religious
institutions shall be construed accordingly.</Pre><p>
Such a provision might have the effect of extending protection to Nepal's other
widely-followed indigenous South Asian religions. On the other hand, it might
also easily evoke feelings of being subsumed in a kind of Hinducentric
hegemony, despite the long history of Hinduism, Buddhism, and shamanism alike
as inclusive rather that exclusive religions, able to coexist well with other
religions. And of course it would not solve the problem of a religion such as
Islam, also present in Nepal for many centuries, or of more recent
introductions such as Christianity.<p>
The latter religion, along with Theravada Buddhism and perhaps other traditions
as well, have felt the effect of anti-missionary provisions included in
previous codes and expressed in this constitution as a prohibition on <i>Dharma
parivartana garâuna, </i>causing another person's religion to be changed
or converted to one's own. This prohibition was added after the draft
constitution, in conformity with earlier anti-proselytizing and anti-missionary
laws. In the past, such prohibitions were sometimes interpreted broadly enough
to justify action against those who changed their own religious affiliations to
another religion. Such actions were brought to bear not only on Nepalese
citizens from various religious traditions who converted to Christianity, but
also in some cases against those who converted from at least nominally "Hindu"
backgrounds to Buddhism. Retention of the prohibition thus raises the question
of whether a relic of the anti-democratic past has been enshrined in the
constitution, or whether, on the other hand, the equality of religions will be
implemented with enough fairness to allow for its application to expansionist
and missionary-oriented Hindu religious movements. <p>
In the case of religions and other areas, it might be useful to think of rights
and freedoms as definable in two modes: parametric and quantum. Parametric
interpretations of rights are based on parameters assumed universally and
equally applicable: e.g., all religions are afforded equal protection and
freedom. Quantum interpretations of rights take cognizance of the embodiment
of rights and their definitions in specific human instances, where ideals of
universal equality are conditioned by the real differences and inequalities of
historical, political and economic conditions: e.g., that the institutional
bases of some religions might enjoy vastly greater political and economic power
than others, and that an apparently equal contest for the loyalties of given
individuals and communities might be no contest at all when that power can be
brought to bear. What from the standpoint of one religion might appear an
unfair restriction or unequal treatment might well appear from others'
viewpoints to be an attempt to ensure that the barefoot runner does not have to
race the man in the Cadillac. In such cases, as with other forms of
affirmative action, fair treatment might require a measure of inequality, if it
could be judiciously applied to even out an unfair advantage held by one side.
But if such measures were taken in Nepal, for example, to help local Hinduism
compete with international missionary religions, could or should they also be
used to help religions such as Buddhism or shamanism compete with whatever
unequal advantages might be enjoyed by the established religion of the "Hindu
kingdom"?<p>
Perhaps it is only realistic in the late twentieth century to recognize that
some religions receive massive financing and support from international
sources, public as well as private, and that traditions with local bases in
poorer countries may require protection and support in order to compete
successfully with transnational religious conglomerates, or even to survive
their onslaught. On the other hand, religious converts do not thereby renounce
their Nepalese identity, and their inclusion in "the nation" seems as desirable
as with any other community if the state and nation are to be truly diverse,
non-discriminatory, and grounded in the identity of the Nepalese people.
Written constitutions such as the Nepal constitution of 1990, the U. S.
Constituion, and similar documents are only a part of the fundamental
principles of governance of their respective polities. The term
"consititution" in the usage of political science and political anthropology
covers a ground that extends beyond these written documents, defining the
fundamental law of a sociopolitical entity even in the complete absence of
written constitutional documents. The classic case for political science is
the British constitution, a complex of traditions extending from Magna Carta
through centuries of parliamentary acts, unwritten common-law traditions,
case-law decisions and legal precedents which together constitute a fundamental
law as binding as any written constitutional document, although a unified
document called a "constitution" is entirely absent. In anthropological usage,
the "constitution" of ethnopolitical entities such as the Ashante (Rattray) or
Cheyenne (Hoebel) is almost invariably unwritten, although the principles of
fundamental law contained in its oral traditions and practices may be perhaps
more binding and less open to dispute and ambiguity of interpretation than the
written constitutions of larger nation-states. In the broadest anthropological
sense, the constitution of a given group or polity is coextensive with its
culture, or at least with those parts of culture taken as normative by its
members.<p>
If a written constituion exists for a given polity, it is simply the
documentary tip of a much more extensive constitutional iceberg, which may
depict the actual constituion in various ranges from relatively accurate to
highly misleading. The Bill of Rights of the U.S. constitution, for example,
depicts rights in absolute terms ("Congress shall make no law regarding...")
which in actual practice (that is, in the actual U.S. constitution as opposed
to its documentary codification) become qualified and limited by precedent,
case law, and ideological cultural consensus: "Freedom of speech does not
guarantee the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre." The guarantees of
freedom of religion in the Soviet and the Chinese (PRC) constitutions have not
always led to rights as unambiguous and unrestricted in practice as the
straightforward language of the respective documents would seem to imply; nor
has the closing qualifier to the Bill of Rights in the Canadian constitution,
which seems to give the government power to take away all the rights guaranteed
in the preceding clauses, in practice led to a wholesale suppression of rights.
Constitutions and their language may be highly important in symbolic terms, but
the meanings of the symbols they invoke must be determined with respect to a
wider range of constitutional practices and traditions than the written
documents themselves are capable of embodying.<p>
It is the growth and development of this wider matrix of written and unwritten
principles and practices that will determine, as it does in every case, the
significance of Nepal's 1990 constitution and the issues it raises. An
introductory survey such as this one, based on the constitutional document
itself embedded in historical and comparative contexts, but without sufficient
development of implementation and interpretation to reveal the larger patterns
and trends of the matrix, can only represent a highly simplified preliminary
sketch of the issues involve. For the moment, such a sketch may be useful in
identifying basic issues and potential paths of development; but the real
meaning and interest of the 1990 constitution will only be shown by the shape
that it takes in the hands of the newly elected representatives, political
leaders, and ultimately the people of Nepal.
******************************************************************
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 00:10:05 +0700 (GMT)
To: The Nepal Digest <nepal@cs.niu.edu>
Subject: Nepali News
Source: Explore Nepal
Post poll politics heading for power game
Politicos of both victorious and vanquished sectors are currently engaged
in new power game. They
would like to see a change in the present government in either content or
leadership. Though not an unusual trend in Nepali political market, the fresh
wind of change appears serious.
In the ruling camp of RPP, the successful completion of the local poll has
been a bone of contention.
Thapa-lobby does not like to give credit to Prime Minister Chand for this.
The followers of Chand, on the other hand, would like to monopolize the
gain. They are not even ready
to thank the communists for the success of the local election.
The ruling CPN - UML is equally divided over the claim of credit for
holding the local election in a successful way.
The lobby close to Deputy Prime Minister Bam Dev Gautam is stressing "because
of our efforts only,
the rival NC has been vanquished in the poll thoughout the country.
"The trend has angered many communists who love being called "General
Secretary Madhav Nepal's
team." "Do not forget the contribution made by Mr. Nepal to the success of the
election. It was he who
defended the communists' following the leadership of RPP leader Chand and
advocating the cause of
parliamentary democracy as explained in the manifesto of the Communists Party
of Nepal, "they
assert." Had the general secretary not engaged himself deeply in the campaign,
the red win would not have been possible at all.
"With the division in the ruling parties and its extended impact on the
cabinet structure over the issue,
the opposition party is seeing the possibility of changing the power -
equation. "If we do not effect the change right now, we will simply not be
able to reach power in the next five
years," said the democrats badly vanquished in the poll."
NC in the present set up of the House of Representatives with the help of
Thapa lobby of RPP, can
destabilize the government. But it cannot uneat it as long as the communists
are one and united. The
fresh strategy of NC is to work out a serious and effective understanding if
the Thapa lobby of RPP
and begin harping the division between the rival lobbies of CPN UML.
The unity surfacing in the communist camp is rather too loose and can explode
any time. The President
of the ruling CPN UML himself is not very happy over rapport between DPM
and PM.
Source: The Kathmandu Post
Post Platform
The metamorhosis - A Satire
KAVITA
Long time back, patrakars (journalists) were considered synonymous with
jandiyas (boozers). I remember hearing snide comments like churot, raksi ra
paan patrakar ko
pahichan. You could see them snooping for juicy titbids they could gossip
about in their
respectivecolumns. Attired in kurtha pajama and slippers, you could
hadly miss them their presence was so conspicuous.
But it seems times have changed. I hardly see a journo in kurtha pajama
nowadays. Those who wear kurtha pair it up with jeans, thus, robbing its
uniqueness. How can kurtha be
separated from a pajama? Anyway the charm of wearing kurtha with pajama is
another thing which the younger generation will never understand. All these
younger generation journos go
for brand names. They spend a months salary on a pair of shoes. I mean
what's so great
about a caterpillar? A journo spent seven grands for a shoes of that brand.
Eeks! catterpillar
reminds me of that scary, prickly crawling animal. How can one wear it?
Seeing such journos makes me nostalgic. I miss those bearded, long haired,
kurtha clad patrakars, sipping tea near the pipal tree in New road. These days, I hardly hear of incidents
like a journo found near a garbage bin unconcious with a doggie by his side.
The doggies near
sahuni ko bhatti was also a part of their group as the faithful old doggie was
the only one
which understood them. The doggie usually accompanied the sozzled journo and
heard his woeful and frustrated jabberring all the way home.
But today's bachchas, these so called brat pack journos, they think they're
leading quite a
life. Sitting at some gazal restaurant making rings from their imported
marlboros, sipping
imported whiskey and listening to the local Alisha Chinoi croon, or they talk
about some western model or actressess and just drool over them in their
imagination. But isn't it
different from actually drinking sahunis homemade aila straight from the
hands of her pretty, petite daughter Maincha, who, if one is lucky can catch
her giving that oh so shy glance?
It used to happen in the good old days - that is why all those journos turned
out to be jandiyas, they would be so intoxicated by Maincha that they would
end up drinking like fish
hoping that Maincha would come to their rescue. That is how all older journos
acquired their vices.
But it is a small price to pay for such a visual treat, don't you agree?
Nowadays, the journos
claim they are teetottalers. Can you believe there are some who actually don't
drink at all? Hay Ram! What a let down!
A teetottaler drooling over some aneroxic model with sunken eyes is something
I can never
understand. In our days they would think something was wrong if a woman was
even slightly underweight. Nowadays it's fashion.
Gone are the days of simple pleasures. Patrakars whizz past the heavy traffic
in swanky cars or sleek mobikes. Whatever, the means of travel they have
missed the fun of walking.
Maybe the competition has compelled them to forsake the good old custom of
walking and running after some politician but they will never know what they
are missing. I mean how
can they find out if they dont walk, whos riding behind whose bike? or
who's having an affair with whom? No wonder the newspapers look dull and bland
these days.
Source: The Kathmandu Post
Three RPP men attacked by UML
By a Post Reporter
KATHMANDU, May 25 - Three RPP activists sustained serious injuries in Ichowk
VDC, Sindhupalchowk when UML activists allegedly attacked them with khukuris
on Saturday evening while they were returning home.
The injured were brought to Kathmandu in a Royal Nepalese Army helicopter
today. One of the injured, Urgen Lama,29, said he was attacked by UML
activists with khukuri and sticks
which has left a 6 inch deep wound on his back.
Likewise, 40 years old Jay Bahadur Tamang has sustained deep wound in his
head, whereas Pemba Lama, 60, is not in good shape. The injured are being
treated in the Teaching Hospital.
Meanwhile, in Makwanpur, one person was injured when a gelignite bursted while
he was closing the windows at his own house. The person who set the gelignite
at Lok Bahadur Thapas house is yet to be identified. Police are actively searching for him. His left hand has
been injured in the accident. The injured Thapa was a candidate for the post
of ward chief in the local election.
******************************************************************
Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 00:10:05 +0700 (GMT)
From: Shyam Sundar Shrestha <sss@ait.ac.th>
To: nepal@cs.niu.edu
Subject: News about Buddha Jayanti Celebration in Thailand.
BUDDHA JAYANTI CELEBRATED IN BANGKOK, THAILAND BY AIT NEPALESE SOCIETY.
May 20, Bangkok.
This is a good news for all the peace loving people that 2541 Anniversery
of the Lord Siddhartha Gautama Buddha has Celebrated at AIT Center,
Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand first
time. AIT Nepalese Society's president Mr. Shyam Sundar Shrestha has
chaired the program. Wippasi
and Vikshus Frakhru Visal Binayabad, Frawippasi Dharmmaramo, and Narawang
Suwathilo have performed Buddha Pujapath on the occasion creating very
peaceful environment. Frakhru Visal Binayabad has explained about the
commencement of Buddhism in Thailand. Frawippasi Dharmmaramo has
explained on Buddha's visits in Kapilbastu, Nepal after his enlightment.
The Lord Buddha was born in Lumbini, Nepal 623 B. C. Buddha was born,
elightened and passed away at the same day, Full Moon day of Baisakha.
Buddha era is started after Mahanirvana. He had passed away at the age
of 80. Hence, his birth day is 80 years ahead of the era.
In the program, Mr. Hari Kumar Pradhan has delivered an introduction
speech and lighted the candle to start the program.
Shyam Sundar Shrestha Tel: (662)-524-5580 (W210) *
<http://www.geocities.com/RainForest/Vines/2345> *
*************************************************************
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 20:16:08 -0400
From: Mohan Thakuri <thakurim@VAX.CS.HSCSYR.EDU>
Subject: Visit Nepal
To: webmaster-tnd@nepal.org
Dear Netters,
A friend of mine is looking for an English-speaking, American to help
her with teaching kindergarten kids. This will be a mutually beneficial,
cross-cultural experience for both parties. The package will include
food, board and pleasant company. Expected duration of stay will be one
year, bur this will be flexible. If interested please respond at this
e-mail address: thakurim@vax.cs.hscsyr.edu
Mohan Thakuri
Syracuse,NY.
******************************************************************
From: "Damber Gurung" <dgrng@CLEMSON.EDU>
To: nepal@cs.niu.edu
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 14:24:17 +0000
Subject: Afghan Islamists Out to Destroy Epic Buddha Stat
IndiaWeb Post
Afghan Islamists Out to Destroy Epic Buddha Statues
By A STAFF WRITER
LOS ANGELES: According to information reaching here the fundamentalist
Islamic warring group of Pakistan-supported Talibans in Afghanistan have
threatened to destroy the 2000-year old world famous Buddha statues in
Bamyan as they consider them =E6insult to Islam.=C6
The Talibans have about two thirds of Afghanistan under their control while
this Bamyan area, in Central Afghanistan, is under the control of
Afghanistan=C6s minority Shia Muslims, not so fundamental as Talibans.
Bamyan Buddha statues were in bad shape but a few years back, well before
the Russian troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, India with the help and
support of UNESCO restored and cleaned them as the site is considered a
heritage for all mankind.
The Hindus consider Buddha as one of the incarnations of Lord Vishnu.
The reports reaching here indicate that the Talibans have amassed nearly
4000 of its soldiers poised to take over Ghorband Valley and over run the
area with Buddha statues. The local Shia Muslim leader is Karim Khalil with
whom the Talibans have refused to negotiate and have openly declared that
everywhere Sunni Islamic laws will prevail. The Buddhist places are not
Islamic and we will have to destroy them, the Taliban leader Mullah Abdul
Wahed said last week. The Talibans have barred women from working in the
offices and girls from schools. They have to cover themselves with veil
from head to foot and can not even go in a taxi with a male driver. Men
have been beaten for not keeping full beard.
The USA Today carried a story in its April 17 edition about the Bamyan
warning that has created resentment all over.
A prominent scientist and VHP activist Dr Shiva Subramanyam from Torrance
has appealed to the world to stop the intolerance of the followers of Islam
out to destroy a part of human heritage. He said the followers of Islam
continue to claim that they are the most compassionate and tolerant
religion. I request every lover of Islam to condemn the proposed action of
the Taliban forces of Afghanistan. I hope and pray that the entire
civilized world, specially citizens of all shades of this blessed USA, will
not keep quiet to this holocaust of cultural heritage of a nation and the
world, he said in a letter.
"The Islamist fundamentalists in their zeal to impose their own rules are
out to destroy the heritage of mankind and it should be opposed by the
whole right-thinking world," said Prithvi Raj Singh, President of the
Federation of Hindu Associations, in a statement. He said erasing history
of a benign and non-violent culture and the famous Buddha statues should
not be tolerated by democratic and really secular people in any country.
[IndiaWeb Post]
***********************************************************
From: "Sunil Sharma" <ssharma@visuallink.com>
To: <NEPAL@cs.niu.edu>
Subject: America Nepal Medical Foundation (ANMF)
Date: Mon, 26 May 1997 22:57:57 -0400
Dear Friends,
In addition to Dr. Karki's ANMFinvitation in the previous issue of TND, I
would also like to invite you to visit the ANMF website at:
http://car.upmc.edu/anmf/index.html Thank you.
******************************************************************
From: <satish.mishra@Millers.milgrp.com>
Date: Tue, 27 May 97 11:41:57 CST
To: nepal@cs.niu.edu
Subject: *IN MEMORIAM GOPAL YONZON
*IN MEMORIAM GOPAL YONZON
So nostalgic for your songs
You are out there somewhere
Invisible-
Yet audible
So familiar
So saddening
So passionate.
Your songs -
More sorrowful now
You are gone.
The flute cries out for
Your last gasp of air.
The morning dew
On the edge of a leaf
Has evaporated.
A mother has lost her son
Lovers have lost their song
Humanity has lost a voice.
The night has fallen-
But you always said
Morning will come
Soon it will be morning.
-Satish Mishra
******************************************************************
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 02:22:27 -0400 (EDT)
From: Hydronp@aol.com
To: nepal@cs.niu.edu
Subject: New website on Nepal's hydropower
Hi all:
We have just setup a new website on Nepal's hydropower development. The site
contains various information resources on the legal provisions (acts),
project agreements on Nepal's hydropower etc. and many more being added
continuously.
Created by the Hydropower Nepal Committe (HNC) of Greater Boston Nepali
Community (GBNC), the website also provides useful information and links on
the Hydropower Nepal forum being organized during the ANA Convention in July.
Please browse the Hydropower Nepal website at:
http://web.mit.edu/arp/gbnc/hnc
or
http://members.aol.com/hydronp
Thank you.
Ashish P. Joshi and Rajesh B. Shrestha
Webslingers
***********************************************************************
Date: Tue, 27 May 1997 16:13:18 EDT
To: tnd@nepal.org
From: REFGID@library.phila.gov
Subject: http://www.nepal.org/ re: Nima's article on SOUL
In the article, the author asks: Does soul serve a purpose? She's already
argued that soul has no material basis ("form") since there's no scientific
proof. All she's left with is to show that soul has no "function" either, to
conclude that it has no existence, and hence is a mere myth. Hence,
the above question.
Now, let us turn her thesis (namely, The Idea of Soul is a Mere Myth") in its
head by turning it into a question format: Does the idea of soul as a myth
serve a purpose? To answer this, we need only answer a subset of the question:
Does a myth serve a purpose? If it does, then the idea of soul must neces-
sarily serve a purpose, since "the idea of soul is a mere myth" (her thesis).
I would answer in the affirmative. But now, we're not talking of soul
as an entity (like heart or liver or to be naughty penis), but merely
as an idea. So we've sidestepped the issue of its existence, so there
is no burden of scientific proof, for an idea is an idea and nothing more...
just like the idea of ghost/dragon/unicorn/medusa/Beavis & Butthead...
which has no "real" existence... although its been given color or shape
by human imagination... and made to appear like it exists. Please do
not be fooled into thinking that you might meet Beavis and Butthead
somewhere in TExas with chainsaws and frogs... and what not. Your
odds of meeting Pamela Lee Anderson are much greater, really.
Now back to the question: does the idea of soul as a myth serve a purpose?
Surely. Take Hinduism. The religion would be hard pressed to explain the
mystical concepts such as "re-incarnation", "nirvana" or "karma" without
the idea of soul. What is re-incarnation? It is the belief that soul
roams around aimlessly inhabiting different physical forms until it is
released into "nirvana", after which there is no more rebirth/reincarnation
on earth. The idea of soul validates the concept of "karma". If there
were no reincarnation or rebirth, then it would be possible for one
to sin all one wanted in this life, and not have pay a penalty in the next.
That is to say, without the idea of soul, anything would be possible (
That is to say, without the idea of soul, anything would be permissible (
this is really Dostoevsky's thesis in BROTHERS KARAMAZOV). Perhaps, there
would be a return to state of nature. So Hinduism needs the idea of soul
to impose some kind of moral order via such concepts as "law of karma".
In that respect, the idea of soul serves a purpose. Whether it has material
existence (like heart or liver) is irrelevant.
Something need not have a physical existence to serve a purpose. Mere idea
suffices. Like Marxism, Capitalism and a host of other "isms". Hell, even
blind faith or lies serve a purpose.
In the nutshell, a function can exist without a physical form. And that
nothing exists in a vacuum. Now as to the question of does the idea of
soul exist? Does unicorn exist? Does Chesire cat exist? Does El Dorado
exist? These are figments of imagination really. Like the author said:
the idea of soul is a myth.... and yet to believers it's all too real.
El Dorado was a myth, yet many died looking for it... it was too real.
To Hindu sadhus in Benaras Ghats, I'm sure... the whole notion of heaven/hell
is all too real. In that respect, believing is only a way of turning
a myth (or figment of imagination) in some kind of "personal realities".
To the author the idea of soul may be just a myth, but too me, it's
a "personal reality" because I happen to believe in it, just as I
believe in "tooth fairy", "the use of marijuana for medicinal or even
recreational purposes" or many other nonsenses that make life so fascinating.
*******************************************************
Date: Sun, 25 May 1997 20:03:51 -0000
To: tnd@nepal.org
From: Helen Abadzi <habadzi@worldbank.org>
Subject: re: looking at Nepal with Western Eyes - May be right!
I read the Kathmandu post article by Arun Gupto about how a westerner saw
Nepalis as backward because the person surmised that they did not know
enough English. And the answer was of course the Nepalis are not backward,
look at the university's English curriculum.
I am a Greek lover of the Nepali language, and I am going be very
controversial by siding with the westerner, but for the exactly opposite
reason: Nepal's language use IS backward exactly because English medium is
used in the university. And becase this is considered natural.
The countries that use English (or French) medium in their education are
mainly the poorest, the multilingual, and those which lack a literate
language. They are practically all of Africa, where the missionaries wrote
the languages only a few years ago, and Papua-New Guinea, where hundreds of
languages exist. Most European and Asian countries, even if they are poor,
completely disdain such a thing. All Arabs study in Arabic, Chinese study
in Chinese, Greeks in Greek, Turks in Turkish, Finns in Finnish, and
Albanians in Shkip. WE ALL also study English as a course and do pretty
well overseas. But NO ONE in these countries thinks that you need English
medium to learn science or math. What nonsense!
It would be one thing if Nepali lacked the terminology, but Nepali has at
its disposal the entire sanskrit vocabulary. And in India committees made
up words like oxygen, algebra, etc. from real native roots that are very
usable in Nepali. So, Nepali is not like some tribal language that lacks
appropriate vocabulary for modern concepts. Nor does Nepal have
multilingualism or a language controversy, like India. All the Tamangs and
Sherpas etc happily speak Nepali.
Nepal is backward because it throws all its good language away! You guys
are just aping the more "developed" (???) India and doing all the wrong
things it does. So, in places like Lamjung one sees English boarding
schools, as if the residents lacked nothing else. Nepalis are progressing
fast! It's gotten to the point where Nepali medium schools are the ones
seen as backward, the way hindi-medium schools are seen in India. And guess
what?? The effects are showing. People's good use of sophisticated sanskrit
words is giving way to English words, just like the Indians do. So Nepalis
happily acquire English and lose their excellent linguistic base. A century
or so from now, the national language of Nepal will be (indian) English.
What progress!!
We, the "second" world citizens who study in our mother tongues AND learn
decent English find English medium terribly backward. In Greek we have a
word for aping foreigners, whose meaning should be quite clear to everyone:
xeno-mania.
Helen Abadzi
habadzi@worldbank.org
******************************************************************
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 15:28:14 -0400 (EDT)
From: pradeep paudyal <pradeep@cse.bridgeport.edu>
To: NEPAL@cs.niu.edu
Subject: The Nepal digest
Dear editor,
I would be really grateful if you could post this message in THE
NEPAL DIGEST.
I am trying to make a database of all the alumni of Siddhartha
Vanasthali School . The initial phase of the database can be accessed at
http://www.bridgeport.edu/~pradeep/vanasthali.html
I would really appreciate if anyone could send me the e-mail address,
short info and batch of any vanasthali alumnus so that I could put in the
database. My e-mail address is pradeep@cse.bridgeport.edu
Thank You.
Pradeep Paudyal
2nd floor Adarsha VDC-2,
55 Myrtle Avenue Silanyas, Gaidakot,
Bridgeport, CT 06604 Nawalparasi, NEPAL
Homepage: http://www.bridgeport.edu/~pradeep Phone: 977-56-20932
Phone: 203 333 8701
*****************************************************************
From: "shambhu sijapati" <ssijapati@hotmail.com>
To: nepal@cs.niu.edu
Subject: matrimony
Date: Wed, 28 May 1997 15:07:08 PDT
Name: "Sudarshan"
Age group: 25-30 yrs
Height: 5'4"
Job: works in a reputed chemical company
Education: Undergraduate
Hobby: Travel,Weight-lifting, Tennis, Rafting
Caste: Brahmin
Health: Excellent
Looking for a bride:
REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS:
Age group: 20 plus yrs
Height: 5'1" plus
Education: High school graduate plus
Caste: doesn't matter
DESIRED QUALIFICATIONS:
The following qualities are a big plus:
good looking,outgoing type, family oriented, at least 50/50 domestic
works, sense of humor, fluency in both languages (Nepali & English),
loving & caring type, generous.
Interested candidates can send email. Please do not attempt to call.
All correspondings will be kept confidential. Good Luck!
******************************************************************************
* *
* The Nepal Digest(TND) is a publication of TND Foundation, a global *
* not-for-profit information and resource center committed to promoting *
* issues concerning Nepal. All members of tnd@nepal.org will get a copy of *
* The Nepal Digest (TND). Membership is free of charge and open to all. *
* *
* TND Foundation Home Page: http://www.nepal.org *
* http://www.himalaya.org *
* http://www.gurkhas.org *
* For Information: info-tnd@nepal.org *
* webmaster: webmaster-tnd@nepal.org *
* *
* TND Foundation contributions (TAX-DEDUCTIBLE) can be mailed payable to: *
* TND Foundation *
* P.O. Box 48 *
* White Plains, NY 10602, USA *
* *
* Subscription/Deletion requests : mailto:TND@NEPAL.ORG *
* Provide one line message: sub nepal "lastname, firstname, mi" <user@host> *
* [OPTIONAL] Provide few lines about your occupation, address, phone for *
* TND database to: <TND@NEPAL.ORG> *
* *
* Snail-Mail Correspondences to: TND Foundation *
* P.O. Box 48 *
* White Plains, NY 10602, USA *
* *
* Digest Contributions: mailto:NEPAL@MP.CS.NIU.EDU *
* THE EDITOR RESERVES THE RIGHT TO EDIT ARTICLES FOR CLARITY. *
* Contributors need to supply Header for the article, email, and full name. *
* *
* Postings are divided into following categories that are listed in the *
* order below. Please provide category-type in the header of your e-mail. *
* *
* 1. Message from TND Editorial Staff *
* TND Foundation News/Message *
* 2. Letter to the Editor *
* Letter to TND Foundation *
* 3. TAJA_KHABAR: Current News *
* 4. KATHA_KABITA: Literature *
* 5. KURA_KANI: Economics *
* Agriculture/Forestry *
* Health *
* Education *
* Technology *
* Social/Cultural Issues *
* Environment/Population *
* Women/Children *
* Tourism *
* Foreign Policy *
* History *
* Military/Police *
* Politics *
* 6. CHOOT_KILA (Humor, Recipies, Movie Reviews, Sattaires etc.) *
* 7. JAN_KARI: Classifides (Matrimonials, Jobs etc) *
* 8. KHOJ_KHABAR (Inquiring about Nepal, Nepalis etc. ) *
* 9. TITAR_BITAR: Miscellaneous (Immigration and Taxex etc. ) *
* *
* COPYRIGHT NOTE *
* -------------- *
* The content contributors are responsible for any copyright violations. *
* TND, a non-profit electronic journal, will publish articles that has *
* been published in other electronic or paper journal with proper credit *
* to the original media. *
* *
******************************************************************************
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% %
%% END OF "THE NEPAL DIGEST". %
%% %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Jan 11 2000 - 11:15:56 CST